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a b s t r a c t
The overlay/underlay topologymismatch affects the performance of existing P2P platforms
that can generate large volumes of unnecessary inter-ISP network traffic. Although recent
works have shown the benefits of network awareness P2P solutions, no studies have
focused on the investigation of the ISP behavior and their cooperative/non-cooperative
attitudes.
This paper proposes a game theoretic framework to help the design of techniques
promoting the ISP cooperation in P2P streaming platforms and decreasing unnecessary
inter-domain streaming traffic.
We first analyze some simple scenarios to discuss the existence of Nash equilibria, the
Pareto optimality, and a fairness criterion to refine the equilibrium points. Moreover, we
apply ideas from Evolutionary Game Theory to design a distributed schemata that the
ISPs can use to reach ‘‘socially acceptable’’ equilibrium points in a large ISP population.
Furthermore, we develop a discrete event simulation to evaluate the effectiveness of the
Evolutionary Game Theory framework.
The study presented in the paper shows that the proposed strategies can effectively
stimulate ISP cooperation aiming at theminimization of inter-ISP traffic andhelp to provide
reliable P2P streaming service.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In P2P applications, the participatingnodes (or peers) formanoverlay networkwhich is largely agnostic on theunderlying
IP network. This increases the cost associated with P2P traffic for individual Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that face the
problem of managing a vast amount of unnecessary inter-domain traffic [1]. Such traffic levels can cause congestion on
valuable inter-ISP links and more generally an overall performance degradation in an ISP network.
Prior studies pointed out that network-aware techniques may drastically reduce the inter-ISP traffic volume [2–4].
Moreover, for P2P streaming, the modeling study presented in [5] showed the positive effects of incorporating network
awareness in P2P streaming applications.
This paper focuses attention on the role of the ISPs. In particular, we do not consider them as simple providers of network
connectivity but as themain players for supporting P2P streaming platforms. To this aim the paper proposes a game theoretic
framework to help the design of techniques promoting the ISP cooperation in P2P streaming platforms. With the help of the
proposed models we derive strategies that can effectively stimulate ISP cooperation aiming at the minimization of inter-ISP
traffic by supporting a reliable P2P streaming service. In particular, the main contributions of the paper can be summarized
as follows.
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• We propose a game theory scheme to enable cooperation among ISPs to support P2P streaming applications as well as
to decrease unnecessary inter-domain streaming traffic.
• We define a utility function of the ISP and discuss the existing equilibrium points and a fairness criterion to select the
equilibrium that satisfies a social fairness criterion.
• Wederive an EvolutionaryGameTheory approach to design a distributed schemata that the ISPs can use to reach ‘‘socially
acceptable’’ equilibrium points in a large ISP population.
• Furthermore, we develop a discrete event simulation to evaluate the effectiveness of the Evolutionary Game Theory
framework and complement the theoretical analysis.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work while a system description and
modeling assumptions are presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the ISP game model and analyzes the Nash
equilibrium, the Pareto optimality, and a fairness criterion to refine the equilibrium points. The Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) model of the ISPs game that allows us to investigate large scale systems is presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we
present a simulation based investigation that complements the theoretical studies we present. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the paper by discussing future research developments.
2. Related works
Recent studies have shown that network-agnostic P2P file sharing applications can generate a large amount of inter-
domain network traffic (see for instance [1]). Studies for P2P streaming applications show similar behavior. In particular,
in [6] a measurement study of PPLive, reported that the 70%–90% of the traffic observed by tagged peers deployed in North
America was originated by peers located in Asia. Furthermore, this study presents some PPLive measurements collected
during a popular live event (the 2006 Chinese New Year celebration) that attracted ∼200,000 users over the Internet
generating an aggregate bit rate of ∼100 gigabits/s! Other results pointing out the effects of topology mismatch in P2P
streaming applications have been proposed in [7].
The problems related with the poor usage of the underlying IP network originate several different research proposals.
In particular, several efforts aiming at a reduction of the inter-ISP traffic. The paper [8] proposes to cache P2P contents by
using ISP-controlled proxy-caches. Theoretically this is an interesting solution because it helps to segregate P2P traffic inside
the ISP network, but due to legal risks for unauthorized exchange of copyrighted contents, this solution is not applicable.
A different approach in [2] proposes the use of an ‘‘oracle’’ provided by the ISP that helps a peer to locate neighbor peers.
A different approach has been presented in [3] where the use of an ISP-controlled tracker has been proposed that provides
network related information such as topology, traffic engineering information, and so on. Another interesting technique
aiming at reducing the inter-ISP traffic in P2P streaming applications has been presented in [9].
We can say that P2P streaming is traditionally a game among two different kinds of players: the content provider and
the users/peers. The existing proposals basically share the idea of helping one of these players, or in some case both of them,
by providing information related with the underlying IP network. In this paper we move a bit further by introducing a third
type of player, i.e., the ISPs. In our study the ISPs become active players of the P2P streaming by shifting their role from
passive network providers to active game players that are able to modulate the network resources they require/offer to the
P2P streaming platform. In particular, we propose a game theory framework to represent the ISP behavior and then, by using
this framework, we investigate the characteristics of the interactions among the ISPs.
The works [10,11] analyze the need to localize P2P file sharing traffic within the ISP boundaries and present some of
the architectural ideas exploited in the present study as well. In particular, [10] proposes an overlay structure composed
by mTrackers (similar in the spirit to the one described in Section 6) aiming at minimizing transit ISP costs. The paper [11]
describes an ISP-friendly variant of BitTorrent to reduce the cross-ISP traffic.
Recently, in the literature, the game theory has gained an important role in modeling strategies used by the peers of a
P2P system and several papers on this topic have been published. In [12–14] game theory models have been used for the
investigation of peer interactions and to analyze incentive mechanisms for P2P file sharing systems. The work presented
in [15] studies the interaction among peers in P2P streaming applications, illustrates the existence of Nash equilibrium
points, and introduces refinement criteria to help the selection among these equilibria.
Our proposal and [16] share the same idea to use EGT for the analysis of the ISPs behavior and the implementation of
an iterative optimization procedure. In [16] the peers organize into groups, e.g., ISPs, and each peer can act as an agent
downloading the content to be shared within the group, leading to the definition of a game with a discrete set of strategies.
The main problem of this proposal concerns the stability of the technique (i.e., any perturbation, such as peer churning,
might lead the to a new solution). Moreover, the EGT based optimization algorithm in [16] requires the estimation of a
payoff function that may produce a significant delay in the optimization. In our proposal the same issue is tackled resorting
to a 2-tier architectural design similar, in the spirit, to other 2-tier P2P architectures used for different purposes, such as
[17,3].
Another paper that is relatedwith our proposal is [18].We sharewith this paper severalmodel assumptions. In particular,
we use the same fluid assumptionwhose consequences are that the peers are able to share their upload bandwidth among all
the participant peers. That is, the stream is seen as a fluid that can be split in a continuous manner among all the requesting
peers.
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Table 1
Notation.
N Set of peers in the system (with |N| = n)
r Video streaming rate (in cps)
cs Streaming server upload capacity (in cps)
cj j-th peer upload capacity (in cps)
Mi i-th partition of peers, with i = 1, . . . , k, and |Mi| = mi
Θi rate at which data are requested by partition i (to other partitions)
Γi rate at which data are received by partition i (from other partitions)
Φi bandwidth resources offered by partition i (to other partitions)
Ψi bandwidth resources provided by partition i (to other partitions)
3. System description and model assumptions
We consider a P2P streaming system composed of a set N of peers (|N| = n) that cooperate to stream a video whose rate
is r . Each peer j is characterized by its upload capacity cj that defines its maximum outgoing bit rate; the video originates
from a server peer whose upload capacity is denoted as cs. Upload capacities are expressed in chunks per second (cps).
Each peer j requests data at rate θj while it receives data at rate γj. We assume an ideal P2P streaming system that does
not generate redundant information, e.g., duplicate chunks; this means that the request rate is θj = r and γj represents the
rate at which peer j receives useful data. In this ideal setting it might be that γj ≤ θj hence the rate at which peer j receives
data may be smaller than r resulting in a non-continuous video playout.
At the same time peer j acts as a data server: it offers other peers resources at a rate φj although resources are actually
provided at rate ψj. Of course, φj ≤ cj, and φj ≥ ψj i.e., the bandwidth resources offered by a peer are less than or equal to
its upload bandwidth and it may happen that not all the offered bandwidth resources are actually used because there are
no peers requesting them.
We consider a partitionM1,M2, . . . ,Mk of the set of peersN , i.e., ∀i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k,Mi ⊆ N, Mi∩Mj = ∅,ki=1 Mi = N ,
and |Mi| = mi. An element Mi of the partition may represent an ISP or an Autonomous Systems and the connection point
betweenMi and the remaining part of the set of peers can be the link (or the links) connecting theMi networks to the rest of
the Internet. In the following we use the term ISP as a synonym for an element Mi. To simplify the derivations, we assume
that the streaming server is the unique (special) peer of ISPM0.
Data request rate can be defined at the ISP level. In particular, peer j inMi requests data from other peers inMi at rate θ ′j
and from peers outside Mi at rate θ ′′j . Of course, θj = θ ′j + θ ′′j . The data request rate of ISP Mi is defined as Θi =
∑
j∈Mi θ
′′
j .
Data received, offered, and provided rates at the ISP level (denoted as Γi,Φi, and Ψi, respectively) are similarly defined.
To ease the task of the reader Table 1 summarizes the notation used to describe the system under study.
3.1. From peers to ISPs
According to the definition of request rate,Θi is the minimum value of the aggregate rate that partitionMi must receive
from the outside such that all the peers ofMi receive a streaming rate supporting a continuous video playout. On the other
hand, if the rate at which data are actually received, i.e., Γi is smaller thanΘi, there are peers of the ISP that cannot correctly
play the stream. The widespread diffusion of P2P streaming applications yields significant implications for ISPs: on the one
hand the increasing amount of P2P traffic results in additional costs for the ISP, that is requested to provide a satisfactory level
of service to its subscribers (not only the P2P streaming users). On the other hand, these applications represent an important
driving force for the adoption of broadband access, which is a significant source of revenue for the ISPs. A successful strategy
to manage the traffic generated by P2P streaming applications must address both the ISP perspective of costs and the
subscriber perspective of quality of service. From the ISP side the rate at which data are received, i.e., Γi, represents a gage
of the offered quality of service. That is, if Γi ≥ Θi, the P2P ISP subscribers may correctly receive the streaming. Obviously
whenΓi < Θi there are peers belonging to the ISP that cannot correctly play the stream. Hence the ISP aiming at fulfilling its
requests tries to get an appropriateΓi. Note that the reduction of the ISP requests, i.e.,Θi can be pursued by using techniques
enforcing locality. We define locality awareness as the peer ability to exploit local resources (e.g., chunks) over remote ones
whenever possible (see for instance [9] or [3]). Hencewe have that an ISP defines its policies for selecting peer neighborhood
and this has an impact on the ISP requests, i.e., onΘi.
On the other hand the costs due to content uploads can be drastically reduced by setting Φi = 0. This can be obtained
by dropping all the communications from peers that belong to the ISP towards peers that are outside (e.g., bandwidth
throttling). It is clear that this extreme ISP free-riding behavior cannot be socially acceptable from the point of view of the
P2P application.
If we assume that the resources offered by an ISP (and by the streaming server) can be used by any other ISP we have
that a universal streaming1 service is possible iff
1 The system provides universal streaming when all participating peers receive the video at rate r [18]. The concept of universal streaming can be
considered a synonym that the P2P streaming platform is providing a good quality service, i.e., the peers of the P2P streaming system are receiving with a rate
at least equal to r .
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cs +
k−
i=1
Φi ≥
k−
i=1
Θi. (1)
In other words, the previous inequality simply states that the continuous playout of the stream is possible if the sum of
offered resources (by the ISPs and by the streaming server) is greater than (or equal to) the sum of requested resources.
Furthermore we can say that the previous inequality is the ISP-equivalent of the result presented in [18] (Theorem 1) for
the peers of a P2P streaming system, and the underlying assumptions of Inequality (1) are similar to the ones used in [18]. In
particular, we are assuming that there is a complete connectivity among the ISPs, and that the resource can be split among
the ISPs in a ‘‘continuous manner’’ (in [18] this is called ‘‘fluid assumption’’). In Section 6.1 we discuss the impact of these
simplifying assumptions on realistic P2P streaming systems.
Please note that a peer j ∈ Mi uses several different criteria to select its neighborhood choosing among peers of Mi and
of other ISPs. These impact on the splitting of θj between θ ′j and θ
′′
j . Our goal is the development of a modeling framework
for the study of the interactions among ISPs that fits P2P applications with different characteristics (e.g., trees, multi-tree,
mesh, pull, push, and so on); therefore we do not want to rely on a specific criterion to select peer neighbors (in the same
or other ISPs). We notice that in our framework, the selection criteria changeΘi, i.e., they impact on the rate at which a ISP
requests data to the other ISPs. In other words, we do not account for the selection criteria but we only consider their effects
on the ISP requests. In Section 6.1 we show that our framework does not depend on the particular section method but only
relies on the ISP requests, i.e.,Θi.
4. Game theory formulation
In Section 3 we defined the request rate for ISPs (Θi, i = 1, . . . , k) that depends on several factors, e.g., algorithms for
overlay network management, number of peers in ISPs, video bit rate, server upload capacity. Rational ISPs aim at reducing
the bandwidth costs by possibly limiting the offered bandwidth Φi (e.g., Φi = 0). Clearly this free-rider behavior of ISPs
would cause the P2P streaming system to work inefficiently.
The main goal of the game theory framework we propose in this section is to avoid this ISP selfish behavior. Here we
introduce a game theorymodel where the players are ISPs. Finally, in Section 5we propose an analysis of the ISP game using
the Evolutionary Game Theory, that allows us to devise a practical algorithm to optimize the interactions among ISPs.
The model is based on the following general utility function
ui(Φ1, . . . ,Φi, . . . ,Φk) = −Cost(Φi)+ Gain

cs +
k−
i=1
Φi ≥
k−
i=1
Θi

. (2)
where offering resources represents a cost for ISPs while the universal streaming of the P2P system represents a gain. We
first provide a mathematical description of this framework by starting with a simple scenario with two ISPs and we later
generalize to the case with an arbitrary number of interacting ISPs.
The 2 ISPs game. Inequality (1) states that the system is providing universal streaming (i.e., the P2P streaming service is
working properly) if
Φ1 + Φ2 + cs ≥ Θ1 +Θ2.
We can use this condition to define the payoff function of the two ISPs game. Player i (i = 1, 2) may receive chunks from
both the streaming server and from the other ISP. We define the cost of ISP i equal to Φi while if Inequality (1) holds we
assume that ISP i receives a gain of g cps.2 If (Φ1,Φ2) is the action profile, we can refine Eq. (2) and define the payoff as
u1(Φ1,Φ2) = −Φ1 + g · 1 (cs + Φ1 + Φ2 ≥ Θ1 +Θ2)
u2(Φ1,Φ2) = −Φ2 + g · 1 (cs + Φ1 + Φ2 ≥ Θ1 +Θ2) , (3)
where
1(condition) =

1 condition holds
0 otherwise.
The above payoff function consists of two terms: the first term denotes the cost (expressed in terms of bandwidth) faced by
ISP i, while the second term denotes the gain of ISP i.
It is reasonable to assume thatΦ1,Φ2 < g , since ISPs will only cooperate with each other if cooperation can benefit both
ISPs and gives them positive payoffs. Let u(Φ1,Φ2) = (u1(Φ1,Φ2), u2(Φ1,Φ2)) be the payoff profile. Fig. 1 (left plot) shows
the set of positive payoff values for Φ1 and Φ2 that allow the universal streaming (gray region) if the upload capacity of all
peers in ISP i is equal to ci (in this case,Φ1 ≤ c1m1 andΦ2 ≤ c2m2).
2 We use the term g to quantify ISP satisfaction/dissatisfaction.
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Fig. 1. Set of payoff values (left plot), and ofΦ1 andΦ2 (right plot) that allow universal streaming for the two ISPs system.
We can see that all the values of Φ1,Φ2 that are on the segment between (0,Θ1 + Θ2 − cs) and (Θ1 + Θ2 − cs, 0) in
Fig. 1 (right plot) are Nash equilibrium points (NE). In particular, if we assume that (x, y) is a point on this line segment and
u(x, y) is the corresponding payoff profile we have that for any h > 0
u1(x, y) = −x+ g
u1(x+ h, y) = −x− h+ g and u1(x, y) > u1(x+ h, y)
u1(x− h, y) = −x+ h− g and u1(x, y) > u1(x− h, y).
Since the same type of derivation can be done for u2(x, y), then we can conclude that any value (x, y) on the line segment
between (0,Θ1+Θ2− cs) and (Θ1+Θ2− cs, 0) is a NE point. On the other hand, we must point out that not all the payoff
profiles on this line segment are ‘‘socially’’ acceptable. Note that there are points such as Φ1 = 0 and Φ2 = Θ1 + Θ2 − cs
(and vice versa). In other words the NE condition does not guarantee a fair contribution of the two ISPs. As a first effort
we try to refine these equilibrium points by using the Pareto optimality [19,20]. In particular, we know that a payoff
profile u(Φ1,Φ2) is Pareto optimal if there is no other payoff profile u(Φ ′1,Φ
′
2) such that u1(Φ
′
1,Φ
′
2) ≥ u1(Φ1,Φ2) and
u2(Φ ′1,Φ
′
2) ≥ u2(Φ1,Φ2). Pareto optimality means that no one can increase his/her payoff without degrading other’s. It is
clear from Fig. 1 (right plot) that all the values on the line segment between (0,Θ1 + Θ2 − cs) and (Θ1 + Θ2 − cs, 0)
are Pareto optimal. Hence, not even the Pareto optimality allows us to discriminate among the values on the segment
(0,Θ1+Θ2− cs) and (Θ1+Θ2− cs, 0). What we need in this case is a criterion that permits us to discriminate among the
values on this segment. In particular, we are interested in a fairness criterion that allocates the Φi-s proportionally to the
amount of required resources. A similar fairness criterion has been proposed in [21] where it has been called effort fairness.
A version of this criterion for our game provides us the following constraint
Φ1
Θ1
= Φ2
Θ2
.
With some simple algebraic manipulation we can derive that the values ofΦ1 andΦ2 satisfying the previous condition are
Φ∗1 =
Θ1(Θ1 +Θ2 − cs)
Θ1 +Θ2 and Φ
∗
2 =
Θ2(Θ1 +Θ2 − cs)
Θ1 +Θ2 .
The k ISPs game. Let Θ1, . . . ,Θk be the incoming aggregate rates of the k ISPs game. In this case the Nash equilibriums can
be found on the hyperplane satisfying the following relation:
k−
i=1
Φi =
k−
i=1
Θi − cs.
Furthermore, the effort fair points (Φ∗1 , . . . ,Φ
∗
k ) are the solution of the following system of equations
k−
i=1
Φ∗i =
k−
i=1
Θi − cs
Φ∗i
Θi
= h for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
where h is a constant. From the second equation we can derive that
Φ∗j = Θj
Φ∗i
Θi
∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k.
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By substituting this in the first equation we obtain that
Φ∗i +
k−
j=1,j≠i
Θj
Φ∗i
Θi
=
k−
j=1
Θj − cs.
From this equation with simple algebraic manipulation we can derive that
Φ∗i = Θi
1− csk∑
j=1,j≠i
Θj
 i = 1, . . . , k. (4)
5. Evolutionary analysis of streaming games
In this section we present a procedure that ISPs can use to compute the effort-fair valuesΦ∗i . Note that these values can
be computed by using Eq. (4) but this requires the knowledge of all the valuesΘj for j = 1, . . . , k, with i ≠ j, i.e., besides its
bandwidth request Θi each ISP has to know the Θj values of all the other ISPs. We assume an ISP does not disclose (to the
other ISPs) information related with the services it offers to the subscribers (i.e.,Θi).
Therefore, to avoid dissemination of its private information we use a two tier structure of trackers composed of a super-
tracker and a collection of ISP-trackers, one for each ISP. This kind of architecture is inspired by the tracker architectures
proposed in [9,22].
In our proposal the ISP-i’s tracker sends to the super-tracker the valuesΘi and the current value forΦi. Then the super-
tracker is able to compute the indicator function 1(·) and it can send the output to the ISPs. In this manner, ISPs do not
disseminate theirΘi-s andΦi-s but they only send these values to a (trusted) super-tracker. Obviously the implementation
of this architecture must ensure that the ISP-trackers and the super-tracker mutually trust each other. Furthermore, this
architecture could also be enhanced with measurement tools that help to avoid cheating behaviors. The two tier tracker
architecture can be viewed as a sort of ‘‘oracle’’ that ISPs can use to know if system is providing universal streaming or not.
By exploiting the two tier tracker infrastructure and by using ideas from Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) [23] we device
a distributed strategy to allow ISPs to compute the effort fairness point.
In EGT each player has local information of the game. In particular, in case of the ISP game the local information are
bandwidth requestΘi, the current value forΦi, and a super-tracker to know if the system is providing universal streaming
or not. The player learnswhichmoves are better by trying themand observing how its utility function changes. The evolution
of the systemof players is ruled by equations called replicator dynamic [23]. The replicator dynamic considers the evolution of
each players behavior and shows the temporal evolution of players moves. In this way, if the game is repeated the replicator
could reach an equilibrium, that is the equilibrium of the game.
The common EGT approach is to consider games with a finite number of strategies. On the other hand the game we
propose has infinite strategies because Φi can take values over a continuous interval. For this reason we cannot use the
classical equation of replicator dynamic, but we create a new dynamic with the same kind of properties.
In the following we illustrate the method for the two ISPs game. In this case we look for a replicator dynamic that has
an equilibrium in (Φ∗1 ,Φ
∗
2 ). The equation of ISP-i should depend only onΦi andΘi and from the knowledge of being in the
universal streaming region or not. In particular, if the ISP is in the universal streaming region it should decrease its Φi to
increase its utility function. If we denote by Φsi the value of the Φi at the s-th iteration step and Φ
0
i the initial values of the
Φi (for i = 1, . . . , k), we use a replicator dynamic described by the following equations
Φs+1i =

Φsi (1− β) if universal streaming
Φsi + βΘi otherwise (5)
where 0 < β < 1 is a parameter that tunes the speed of convergence. We can assume that the ISP-i decreases Φi
proportionally to the same value computed in the previous iteration. If the ISP has a high Φi it is probably far from the
bound of the region, so it could decreaseΦi a lot. Instead, if the ISP has a lowΦi it is probably close to the bound, so it should
pay attention on decreasingΦi. On the other hand, if the ISP is not in the universal streaming region it would try to increase
its Φi faster to reach that region. In this case, it is reasonable that the ISP increases Φi depending on its request, i.e.,Θi. We
can see the evolution of the dynamic system with the help of Fig. 2.
If we start the iterative method from a point (Φ01 ,Φ
0
2 ) that is in the universal streaming region, then the system will
move out the region in a radial way, i.e., following the line to the point (0, 0). On the other hand, if we start from a point
that is out of the universal streaming region then we will move along the vector (βΘ1, βΘ2). This means that in this case
we always move in the same direction, i.e., all the movements are parallel to the line t∗ : Φ1Θ2 = Φ2Θ1. In this manner
there is no need need to know the bandwidth request of the other ISPs to choose its move (i.e., theΘj-s (for j ≠ i)).
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Fig. 2. (a) Vector field of the dynamic system (the symbol  denotes the point (Φ∗1 ,Φ
∗
2 )); (b) Evolution of the replicator dynamic.
We must point out that with a similar iteration strategy the process will oscillate around the effort-fair points and the
size of this fluctuation interval depends on β . That is, a small value of β yields smaller fluctuation interval but with lower
speed of convergence, and a large value of β yields higher speed of convergence but larger fluctuation interval. To overcome
this problem we can adopt a variable β , i.e., a value of β that is function of s and of the stability of the convergence process.
We empirically, derive a suitable updating strategy for the values of β .
In the following we prove that the iterative method converges to the effort-fair points.
Proposition 1. Each ISP converges to its ownΦ∗i .
Proof. For the sake of readability we only present the proof for the case k = 2 (the proof for k > 2 follows the same ideas
but with the use of a cumbersome notation).
First of all, we show that the line t∗ : Φ1Θ2 = Φ2Θ1 is a fixed line of the replicator dynamic, i.e., if the staring point of
the iteration, i.e., p(0) = (Φ01 ,Φ02 ) is on the line t∗ then for any other iteration step s we have that p(s) = (Φs1,Φs2) ∈ t∗. If
p(0) ∈ t∗ then
p(0) =

Φ01 ,
Θ2
Θ1
Φ01

.
Now there are two cases:
• p(0) is in the universal streaming region and then
p(1) = p(0) − βp(0) =

Φ01 (1− β),
Θ2
Θ1
Φ01 (1− β)

,
so p(1) ∈ t∗.
• p(0) is not in the universal streaming region. In this case we have that
p(1) = p(0) + β(Θ1,Θ2) =

Φ01 + βΘ1,
Θ2
Θ1
(Φ01 + βΘ1)

,
and again p(1) ∈ t∗.
We can conclude that t∗ is a fixed line of the replicator dynamic.
We prove now that the line t∗ is an attractor of the dynamic system. Let p = (x, y) be a generic point (see Fig. 2) in the
universal streaming region. In this case the system will move in a radial direction along the line t until it falls out of the
universal streaming region, e.g., in the point p′ = (x′, y′). This point is not in the universal streaming region, so the system
will move along a new line, parallel to t∗, until it returns into the universal streaming region. Let p′′ = (x′′, y′′) be the new
point reached by the system. The systemwill move along a new radial line t ′, that is closer to t∗ with respect to the previous
line t . Going on we have that the radial line tends to t∗, so we can conclude that t∗ is an attractor of the system.
Finally, we have that the system oscillates around the effort-fair point (Φ∗1 ,Φ
∗
2 ). Indeed, each Φ
s
i will oscillate into the
interval [Φ∗i − βΦ∗i ,Φ∗i + βΘi]. This means that using an opportune function for decreasing β we obtain for each ISP-i the
convergence to its effort-fair pointΦ∗i . 
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Fig. 3. Numerical experiment with k = 1000, r = 50 cps, cs = 50 · r,mi ∈ Unif[100, 1000], andΘi ∈ Unif[r,mi · r].
Numerical experiments. The convergence of the EGT scheme in case of large systems is investigatedwith a set of numerical
experiments with the following parameters: we consider r = 50 cps to be the streaming rate, cs = 50 · r the server
upload capacity, and k = 1000 the number of ISPs. The number of peers in the i-th ISP, is derived in the following manner:
mi = Unif(100, 1000), and the value forΘi is derived as followsΘi = Unif(r,mi · r), where Unif(a, b) is a random number
uniformly selected in the interval [a, b]. From the large set of experiments we performed we derived similar results in
terms of speed of convergence. Fig. 3 summarizes the results of one of these experiments. In particular, the figure shows
the evolution of three values of Φ∗i derived by applying our EGT based approach. For each value of the Φ
∗
i -s the figure also
shows the corresponding theoretical values computed by using Eq. (4).
The experiments show that in all the cases the convergence is achieved with a few number of iterations (e.g., between
30 and 40 iterations).
6. An ISP streaming traffic management algorithm
In Section 4we introduced a simple game theoretic framework but in all themodels we presented the equilibrium points
can only be achieved via common knowledge. In other words, each ISP needs to know the streaming server upload capacity
and the Θi-s of all the other ISPs. Obviously this hypothesis is not realistic in practical systems. Nevertheless, by using the
ideas presented in Section 5 we can define a distributed algorithm that implements the EGT version of the game without
the constraints that the ISP must be aware of theΘi-s of all the other ISPs.
The proposed distributed algorithm could be implemented by means of a two tier structure of trackers (similar in the
spirit to the tracker architecture proposed in [9,22,17]). At the top level there is the super-tracker and at the lower level
there is a collection of ISP-trackers (one for each ISP). Each ISP-tracker must be able to measure the current values of (i) the
number of active peers in the ISP, (ii) the number of peers that receive the video at rate r , and (iii) the values forΘi, andΦi.
Furthermore, the ISP-tracker is able to modify the bandwidth offered to the other ISPs (e.g., by using bandwidth throttling).
Each ISP-tracker periodically (e.g., each δ sec) sends the collected measures to the super-tracker that can use them to
verify whether the system is in a universal streaming region or not. The super-tracker replies to the ISP-trackers with a
universal-streaming or no-universal-streaming message. In turn, the ISP-trackers are required to update the
values ofΦi-s according to Eq. (5).
This two-tier architecture represents a practical solution for using global knowledge at the ISP level. Obviously, the ISPs
shall trust the common super-tracker, that is actually acquiring ISP-trackers private information but it is not disclosing
such data to the ISPs. In fact the super-tracker only discloses the result of the universal streaming indicator function. In
this paper we neglect a number of open issues that are left for future research and practical implementation. Among such
extensions we mention the need for incentive mechanisms to enforce cooperation among the ISPs, the implementation
control techniques to guarantee ISP honesty, and the confidentiality of the communications between the super-tracker and
ISP-trackers. Finally it is important to notice that the two-tier architecture, composed of the super-tracker and the collection
of ISP-trackers, only aims at ISP traffic management and does not replace or interfere with the architecture of the adopted
P2P application. In other words, if the P2P streaming architecture uses a tracker similar to the BitTorrent protocol to assist
the streaming distribution (e.g., to provide peer addresses) this tracker does not interfere with the ISP traffic management.
6.1. Experimental results
To investigate the characteristics of the EGT schemewe develop a discrete event simulator that implements in an abstract
manner most of the features of a pull-based P2P streaming application that interacts with our EGT algorithm.
Simulator description. The simulator models a P2P streaming system where the peers are grouped into k different ISPs. The
simulator is based on the implementation of three agents, namely the peer, the ISP-tracker and the super-tracker. The
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interactions among the peers, and among the ISPs are governed by two different dynamics: the peer dynamic and the
proposed EGT algorithm.
The simulator assumes a chunk based P2P system and hence all the download and upload capacities are discretized in
terms of chunk size. Each peer belongs to a certain ISP i and it is characterized by its upload bandwidth. Without loss of
generality, we assume that all the peers in the i-th ISP share the same maximum upload capacity ci (in chunk). The goal of
the peer is to connect to other peers in the swarm in order to download enough chunks per seconds to play the video. In the
simulator this is represented by r download connection slots that the peers try to fill with resources offered by other peers.
In conclusion, the peers can be represented as nodes in a graph that models the swarm, where each peer has ci outgoing
stubs and r incoming stubs.
The peer dynamic is represented by means of k independentM/M/∞ (or more generallyM/G/∞) stochastic processes,
whereλi andµi represent the arrival and the departure rates of peers for the i-th ISP.When a newpeer joins the P2P swarm it
selects (with the help of a P2P tracker) the candidate neighboring peers according to a given selection strategy and attempts
to establish at least r connections. If all the required incoming connections cannot be created because of lack of resources
offered in the system the peer keeps searching for more neighbors with a granularity of T seconds, that in our simulation
has been fixed at 10 s.
An important issue of our simulator concerns the neighborhood selection criteria. We implemented two very different
neighboring management policies so as to show that the proposed EGT solution does not depend on a particular choice.
According to the first criterion each peer selects as a neighbor a peer in its ISP with a fixed probability p, (from other
ISPs with probability 1 − p). The second approach is based on a random choice over all the connected peers; this latter
criterion represents the most diffused implementation using a central P2P tracker that logs all the peers in the swarm and
randomly selects a set of neighbors upon request by a given peer. The latter criterion yields a variable probability pi of
neighbor selection in the i-th ISP equal to pi = mi∑k
l=1 ml
.
The other agents in the system are the k ISP-trackers and the super-tracker that implement the proposed EGT algorithm.
The i-th ISP-tracker has two roles: the first is to evaluate the values of Θi and Φi, by counting all the bandwidth resources
requested/offered by the peers in the ISP, and to communicate such figures to the super-tracker every δ seconds. The second
task is to react to the super-tracker messages by controlling the offered resourcesΦi according to the policy in Eq. (5). When
necessary the ISP-trackers reduce the offered resources by simply pruning some of the inter-ISP connections. In turn, the
peers will try to establish new links according to the P2P application policy that is unaware of the on-going EGT algorithm.
The role of the super-tracker is to collect the values of Θi and Φi so as to verify if the system is in the universal streaming
regime or not, using Eq. (1). Finally, the super-tracker communicates the result of the evaluation to all the ISP-trackers. The δ
parameter, which determines the frequency of the EGT adaptation round, is not very critical. A small value for δ yields more
control over the peer dynamics. On the other hand, a frequent action of the EGT would rise frequent bandwidth throttling
operations that have a negative impact on the continuity of service offered to the end users.
The simulator allows us to test the performance of the proposed EGT and its interactionswith themaintenance policies of
the P2P application. The behavior of the EGT is monitored by logging the values ofΘi,Γi,Φi andΨi. Moreover, we introduce
a performance index of the quality of service offered by the i-th ISP QoSi, which is defined as the ratio between the number
of peers that are enjoying the video and the number of active peers in the same i-th ISP.
Experiments. The discrete event simulator has allowed us to test the proposed EGT algorithm and analyze its performance
as a function of the most important system parameters, namely the peer’s upload capacity, the neighbor selection policy
and the ISPs average population size. In all the following simulations the EGT is played with a frequency δ = 30 s. The same
simulator has been used to obtain the reference performance of a P2P application that does not enforce any control on the
inter-ISP traffic by disabling the EGT algorithm.
Table 2 summarizes the parameters of the investigated scenario. We simulate a streaming server equipped with an
upload capacity that is 50 times the video rate r . As already stated we assume that the peer dynamics are represented
by k independent M/M/∞ processes. In the following we present results for k = 3 ISPs with different peers’ arrival and
departure rates so as test the proposed optimization in the presence of ISPs with different average sizes. Moreover, we
consider ISPs that are heterogeneous also in terms of the upload capacity ci. In all the simulated cases the average sojourn
time of a peer in the system is kept constant and equal to w = 15 min. The total number of peers in the P2P swarm is on
average n = 1000. As shown in Table 2, ISP-1 has the largest upload capacity (5 × r) but covers only the 10% of the peers,
ISP-2 represents a small group of peers with limited upload whereas ISP-3 contains 80% of the P2P overlay but offers the
smallest upload.
The first goal of the simulative study is to prove the feasibility and the effectiveness of the proposed EGT-based
optimization. To this end we analyze the dynamic of the requested, offered and provided bandwidth resources at ISP level
(Θi,Φi and Ψi, normalized with respect to r). In the following, we show average values computed over 32 simulation trials
so as to achieve good accuracy that has been estimated using 95% confidence interval. All the numerical results reported in
the following exhibit a margin of error below 1%. The transient period before theM/M/∞ process driving the peer dynamic
achieve the steady state regime has been removed from all averages.
Table 3 shows the average value of mi,Θi,Φi and Ψi when the P2P application uses a fixed probability of connecting
inside the same ISP p = 1/3. All the bandwidth resource values are expressed in chunks and normalized with respect to the
video rate r . We can observe that without EGT all the peers offer to the other peers all their spare bandwidth resources, as
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Table 2
System parameters for the first set of experiments.
k 3
n ≈1000
r 35 (cps)
cs 1750 (cps) (50× r)
w 15 min
ci 175 (5× r) 42 (1.2× r) 35 (1.0× r)
mi ≈0.1× n ≈0.1× n ≈0.8× n
Table 3
Simulation experiment with fixed probability neighbor selection p = 1/3.
Fixed probability neighbor selection
Without EGT With EGT
ISP1 ISP2 ISP3 ISP1 ISP2 ISP3
mi 100.63 98.13 794.48 106.69 96.81 799.02
Θi 50.31 49.06 397.24 53.34 48.40 399.51
Φi 503.14 117.75 794.48 48.30 43.59 361.95
Ψi 255.10 55.81 71.80 48.47 43.68 85.66
QoSi 0.9831 0.9844 0.9825 0.9830 0.9822 0.9823
Table 4
Simulation experiment with variable probability neighbor selection pi = mi/∑3j=1 mj .
Variable probability neighbor selection
Without EGT With EGT
ISP1 ISP2 ISP3 ISP1 ISP2 ISP3
mi 104.03 102.60 805.96 98.18 100.07 805.36
Θi 93.27 92.12 164.97 88.49 90.00 159.51
Φi 520.14 123.12 1128.35 75.99 76.20 136.99
Ψi 81.86 61.97 127.29 70.74 62.67 124.07
QoSi 0.9826 0.9828 0.9823 0.9827 0.9827 0.9824
evident from the values ofΦi; such resources are exploited in a randomway by the other parties using the fixed probability
criterion for neighbor selection. Recalling that in Table 3 the reported values are averages computed when the P2P system
reaches its equilibrium, one notes that the P2P application provides an unfair resource usage. In fact ISP-1, that has the
largest upload, provides on average Ψ1 = 255.10× r chunks regardless of the fact it requests onlyΘ1 = 50.31× r chunks
to serve the 10% of the peers in the swarm. On the other hand ISP-3, that is the largest in terms of size but has a limited
upload, requests Θ3 = 397.14 × r chunks whereas it contributes only with Ψ3 = 71.80 × r chunks. The effect of EGT
can be appreciated on the right hand side of Table 3. One observes that the EGT algorithm is able to equalize the requested
and offered resources (see the values of Θi versus Φi) pushing the system towards the optimal point identified by Eq. (4),
that clearly corresponds to a criterion of effort fairness. Also in this case the offered resources are exploited according to the
rules of the P2P application determining the values of the upload that are actually provided. It turns out that by means of
EGT, ISP-1 is able to reduce its upload towards the other ISPs down to Ψ1 = 48.47 × r chunks. To counteract this ISP-3 is
asked to increase the resources it provides from about 72× r to 86× r chunks. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the EGT
optimization does not incur any penalty in terms of the offered service leading to values of QoSi larger than 0.98 in all the
simulated cases.
Table 4 shows the results obtained by changing the behavior of the P2P application, that in this case implements the
variable probability neighbors selection criterion (p = mi/∑3j=1 mj). The obtained results are quite similar to the one we
have just commented except for the absolute values of the requested and provided resources, that clearly depend on the
efficiency of the P2P application. As an example, in absence of EGT, the variable probability criterion turns out to be less
unfair for the ISP-1 (Ψ1 = 81.86 × r chunks) with respect to the results in Table 3. Nonetheless, the EGT is again able to
equalize the resource usage leading to a lower Ψ1 = 70.74× r chunks without impacting on the quality of service.
From previous analysis of the experimental results we can conclude that the EGT improves the resource usage fairness but
does not affect the quality of the service, provided that enough resources can be allocated to the service by the ISPs so as to
guarantee service continuity. Moreover, we have shown that the EGT does not depend on the neighbor selection criterion, thus
turning out to be useful independently of the approach adopted by the P2P application to build and maintain the streaming
overlay.
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Table 5
Experiment with variable probability neighbor selection with c3 = 33, 32, 31, 30, 29, that is, c3 = 0.9428 × r, c3 = 0.9142 × r, c3 =
0.8857× r, c3 = 0.8571× r , and c3 = 0.8286× r (the table only reports the values for QoSi).
No-EGT EGT
ISP1 ISP2 ISP3 ISP1 ISP2 ISP3
c3 = 33 0.9829 0.9831 0.9828 0.9834 0.9836 0.9727
c3 = 32 0.9829 0.9832 0.9829 0.9823 0.9829 0.8560
c3 = 31 0.9832 0.9835 0.9836 0.9824 0.9829 0.7378
c3 = 30 0.9837 0.9839 0.9836 0.9819 0.9823 0.6583
c3 = 29 0.9836 0.9843 0.9842 0.9826 0.9829 0.6054
Fig. 4. Simulation traces for the scenario with c3 = 32 (c3 = 0.9142× r), left plot with α = 0, right plot with α = 0.3.
Table 6
Simulation experiments with c3 = 32 using different values of α.
α = 0 α = 0.3
ISP1 ISP2 ISP3 ISP1 ISP2 ISP3
mi 92.69 98.37 823.34 98.35 101.33 805.74
Θi 84.16 88.78 155.59 88.64 91.06 160.50
Φi 70.53 73.50 135.35 102.77 105.20 184.99
QoSi 0.9823 0.9829 0.8560 0.9833 0.9835 0.9831
For the next experimentwe slightlymodify the systemparameters of Table 2. In particular, we set c3 = 33, c3 = 32, c3 =
31c3 = 30, and c3 = 29 so that the resources offered by ISP-3 are lower than the minimum required. In other words, the
peers in ISP-3 exhibit a (light) free-rider behavior. Table 5 compares the values of QoSi obtained using and not using the
EGT. For conciseness we present only the results for the variable probability neighbor selection criterion. In Table 5 it is
important to note that the EGT, increasing the effort fairness, penalizes the free-rider ISP (see the values for QoS3 in the two
cases). Therefore we can conclude that the EGT can be used to discourage free-riding at the ISP level.
In this last part of the experimentation we use EGT and the super-tracker for a different purpose, namely to reserve a
margin of spare resources in the system to counteract abrupt dynamics due to peer churning or flash crowd or simply to
improve the overall quality of service. The super-tracker driving the EGT can also be used to force the ISPs to offer more
than what is strictly necessary in order to globally improve the quality of service. Such an approach could be employed to
limit the effects of bandwidth resource fluctuations that may arise in case of high peer churning. This goal can be achieved
by modifying the universal-streaming test performed by the super-tracker as follows:
cs +
k−
i=1
Φi ≥

k−
i=1
Θi

× (1+ α), (6)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a parameter used to assume that the ISPs needs are larger than what they are instantaneously reporting
by theirΘi values.
The effects of Eq. (6) is shown in Fig. 4 that reports two simulation traces with α = 0.0 (left) and α = 0.3 (right). Each
plot shows two 200 s traces representing the overall amount of requested resources (solid line) and the overall amount
of received resources (dashed line) for the peers of the ISP-3. These quantities have been normalized with respect to the
streaming rate r . Clearly, the time intervals during which the received resources are less than required (the dashed line lies
below the solid one) correspond to periods when the video service cannot be assured to all peers in the ISP. It is evident
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that α = 0.3 guarantees a better quality of service to the peers. This qualitative evidence is also supported by the average
indexes reported in Table 6. It is worth noting that the values of Θi remain almost constant with varying α, whereas the
offered and provided resourcesΦi and Ψi increase with α.
7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have developed a game theory framework that can be used for the design of ISP strategies aiming at
providing efficient and reliable support for P2P streaming application. Our framework allows us to illustrate the existence
of equilibrium points, the role of possible strategies to refine these points, and how to use ideas from the evolutionary game
theory to derive techniques, that a player of the game can use, to computed the (operational) points assuming only limited
knowledge on the state of the other players.
The future developments of this research follow several directions. First of all, we are going to deepen the simulation
based analysis show the relation among peer dynamics, the effects of these dynamics of the fluctuation of the functionsΘi-s
andΦi-s, and possible strategies to smoothen these variations.
Another direction we are developing concerns the use of more sophisticated payoff functions that include information
on the size of the ISP and on the subscription fees it applies to its subscribers. This could be obtained by using in Eq. (3) a
term g that depends on the size of the ISP, and on the subscription fees. In other words we could use a term gi, i.e., function
of the peculiarities of the ISP-i. This model enhancement could explore other different interactions/competitions among the
ISPs, e.g., competition for attracting users, and competition on subscription fees. Furthermore, we can also implement other
fairness criteria, based for instance, on the function gi, i.e., that accounts for ISP rewards.
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